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Juvenile Delinquency and the
Transition to Monopoly Capitalism
KEVIN I. MINOR
Eastern Kentucky University
Department of Correctional Services
This paper identifies three macrosociological forces (i.e., the social position
of youth, private market relations, and poverty and inequality) that are
crucial for understanding delinquency and analyzes how these forces
evolved together as part of the historical transformation in the United
States to monopoly capitalism. The thesis is that these forces have con-
tributed to delinquency by acting collectively to decrease the capacity of
social institutions to maintain informal social control. Implications for
policy are also considered.
Research has demonstrated that, during the course of child-
hood and adolescent socialization, the more meaningfully in-
tegrated persons became to those social institutions which
promote informal social control, such as the family, school, and
work, the lower the likelihood of delinquency. Concomitantly,
the more integrated youths become to a delinquent peer group,
the greater the chances of delinquency (Agnew, 1985; Caplan
& LeBlanc, 1985; Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985; Gardner &
Shoemaker, 1989; Hindelang, 1973; Hirschi, 1969; Wiatrowski,
Griswold, & Roberts, 1981).
Social institutions can be conceptualized as mediators be-
tween the macro level political economy and micro level indi-
vidual behavior. Through their impact on social institutions, the
macro forces emanating from a society's political economic or-
ganization shape the quantity and quality of behavioral choices
available to individuals (Groves & Frank, 1986). By diminishing
the capacity of institutions, especially the family, to positively
influence the choices made by youths and by rendering youths
vulnerable to delinquent socialization in peer groups, macro
forces can weaken informal mechanisms of social control.
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Theorists seeking to situate delinquency in the political eco-
nomic context of the United States (e.g., Colvin & Pauly, 1983;
Greenberg, 1977; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1985) have
generally focused an one of three macro forces, including ei-
ther: (1) the socially defined position of youth, (2) the impact
of market relations, or (3) poverty and inequality within the
network of social class relations. However, studying one force
without reference to the others can lead to an incomplete and
fragmented analysis. A purpose of this paper is to show that
the forces are closely connected in two ways. First, all three
forces evolved together as part of the transformation of the
political economy from laissez-faire to monopoly or late cap-
italism. Second, the forces have acted collectively to weaken in-
formal mechanisms of social control. In establishing this second
connection, the paper accomplishes another purpose, namely
to move the political economic analysis of delinquency toward
a micro level grounding. Such analyses usually lack a micro
grounding (see Lynch & Groves, 1989; Melossi, 1985), which can
make it difficult to appreciate the direct relevance to delinquent
behavior. The paper also illustrates implications for policy.
The Socially Defined Position of Youth
The social position that youths now occupy was, in large
part, molded by reforms arising from the child saving move-
ment of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
reforms consist of the enactment of compulsory education leg-
islation, the passage of child labor laws, and the creation of the
juvenile justice system (Bortner, 1988; Platt, 1977; Starr, 1986).
The child saving movement was not an economically deter-
mined, tightly coordinated orchestration by elites having mono-
lithic interests and purely selfish intentions. Though the
reforms arising from the movement were inspired by the move
to monopoly capitalism and accommodated the changing po-
litical economic order, the conscious intents of reformers must
be carefully distinguished from the effects of reforms. Many
reformers possessed a genuine desire to improve the plight of
youths, particularly youths of immigrant stock living in under-
privileged urban areas (Platt, 1977). In addition, as Kett (1977)
observes, support for reforms came from political coalitions
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with divergent and sometimes conflicting interests (e.g., philan-
thropists, educators, criminal justice officials, business leaders,
and organized labor). Contrary to substantiating allegations of
economic determinism and instrumental elitism, then, the his-
torical evidence indicates that connections between economic
transformation and the child saving reforms were mediated
by the varied interests and political actions of reform support-
ers (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Rothman, 1980). Nevertheless, the
groups who supported various facets of the child saving move-
ment were drawn from middle and upper class circles and
shared a fundamental allegiance to economic transformation in
that they sought to adjust youths to fit the new order, not the
reverse (Nasaw, 1979; Platt, 1977; Shelden & Osborne, 1989).
With the accumulation and concentration of capital in the
decades after the Civil War, the former system of economic pro-
duction which had been dominated by agriculture and small-
scale entrepreneurs (often family businesses) competing over
shares of markets, gradually expanded into a system character-
ized by monopolistic corporations, urban factory production, a
more abundant surplus of commodities, and heightened state
regulation (Baran & Sweezy, 1966; Braverman, 1974; Edwards,
1979). The child saving reforms, geared as they were toward
altering the way youths were socialized, can be understood
against this backdrop of economic transition. Each reform ex-
tended formal state control over youths to help redefine the
role of youths vis-a'-vis the changing political economic order
(Bernard, 1992). State control was warranted to contain the class
unrest surrounding economic transition and to redirect people
into the emerging order. Youths were a favorable target of con-
trol because they represented the future generation of labor
power. In effect, the responsibility of traditional institutions
for socializing young people was buttressed and, to an extent,
replaced with state control (Platt, 1977).
There are at least two reasons why altered socialization of
youths was central to economic transformation. First, the greater
potential for consumption sparked by the growth of commod-
ity surplus created the need for youths to develop disciplined
consumption patterns and tailor any extravagant aspirations for
economic success they might have around realistic life oppor-
tunities (i.e., to accept their standings and responsibilities in the
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class hierarchy). Second, youths had to be socialized to embrace
the workplace character traits demanded by the shift to factory
production (Nasaw, 1979). This shift was rendering obsolete the
mechanisms of direct control traditionally exercised by employ-
ers over employees (Edwards, 1979). Technical control, which
relied on machines to guide the labor process, and bureaucratic
control, which altered the social relations of the workplace by
instituting an impersonal system of role coordination and hi-
erarchical authority, were increasingly substituted for control
imposed directly by employers. The traditional apprenticeship
system was ill-prepared to socialize youths in a fashion that
would maximize the efficiency of these newly instituted work-
place controls. This type of socialization required the internal-
ization of norms and values consistent with mass production,
the discipline to submit to hierarchy and function as a team
player in a corporate bureaucracy.
Compulsory Education and Child Labor Laws
As economic transformation and technological innovation
proceeded, making apprenticeship increasingly obsolete and re-
ducing the strong demand for child labor that had charac-
terized earlier stages of industrialization (Kett, 1977), a need
emerged to impart on youths the specialized job skills, training
certifications, and ethos required to participate in monopoly
capitalism. Gradually, from 1850 on, child labor was restricted
and school attendance made mandatory by legislation. Such
legislation appealed to a variety of moral and economic interests
(Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Humphries & Greenberg, 1981; Kett,
1977; Platt, 1977). Child labor laws promised to ameliorate the
lot of children in factories, and education, by promising up-
ward mobility, seemed a viable way to achieve social equality.
Likewise, in view of the mass urbanization and immigration
coinciding with industrialization, education represented a way
to obtain greater cultural uniformity and a way to systematically
and efficiently guide the moral development of children. Com-
pulsory education and child labor restrictions also meant that
youths could not fully enter the labor market until a specified
age was reached. To organized labor, the implications were that
competition for jobs would decrease and that wage levels would
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be less threatened by inexpensive child labor. The implication to
businesses that did not rely heavily on child labor for profit was
that competitors who were still doing so would either have to
raise outlays for labor or be driven from the market. To business
and political leaders alike, the preservation of adult jobs was an
attractive way to contain the working class unrest associated
with wide-scale unemployment.
However, the effects of the transfer of youths from the labor
market to the schools exceeded these appeals and also went be-
yond the obvious need to supply the technical training required
by shifts in production. As Bowles and Gintis (1976, p. 186)
demonstrate, "schooling was.., a means of producing the new
forms of motivation and discipline required in the emerging cor-
porate order." The structural correspondence between the social
relations of the educational experience and the social relations
of the workplace under late capitalism eased the movement of
youths into the labor force and increased their productive capac-
ity. Schooling reproduced a social consciousness, a personality,
and a set of interpersonal behavior patterns that were congruent
with labor force participation. The structure of the educational
experience replicated the hierarchical division of labor as well
as the bureaucratic relationships of authority and control typical
of the workplace; this is clearly exemplified by competition over
grades and such practices as tracking and the establishment of
separate curriculums.
The Juvenile Justice System
The first juvenile correctional institutions opened in the first
half of the nineteenth century, and efforts to formally control
youthful deviance became more systematized at the turn of that
century with the creation of the juvenile court. The court and
its corollary agencies spread rapidly across the country with
little opposition (Rothman, 1980; Sutton, 1985). The system was
praised as a humane improvement over the earlier practice
of processing juvenile offenders with adult offenders; it also
afforded juvenile justice workers considerable discretion and
power and was congruent with the desire of business leaders
for orderly urban communities in which to foster commerce
(Shelden & Osborne, 1989).
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The court's parens patriae ideology, emphasizing the pater-
nalistic role of the state and the need to tailor intervention
around the welfare of the individual child, justified enormous
governmental discretion over the lives of youths and made due
process appear to be an unnecessary obstruction. This ideol-
ogy was deemed especially appropriate for immigrant children,
since their families could hardly be counted upon to assimi-
late them to American culture (Nasaw, 1979; Rothman, 1980).
More generally, the existence of the court ensured that when-
ever traditional social institutions failed to control youthful de-
viance informally, a formal substitute was available to inculcate
moral values, industriousness, and obedience to authority (Lia-
zos, 1974).
The codification of a new category of behaviors known
as "status offenses" and the authority accorded the court to
regulate these behaviors expanded and diversified state power
over youths. Control was extended beyond criminal activities
to cover age-specific conduct heretofore unregulated by the
state, such as incorrigibility. The court's mandate to control
status offenses, coupled with research demonstrating the preoc-
cupation of many early courts with status and minor property
offenses (Kett, 1977; Nasaw, 1979; Shelden & Osborne, 1989),
underscore the court's role in regulating the petty infractions
and moral transgressions surrounding increased availability of
commodities.
Withering of Informal Social Control
A net effect of the child saving reforms was to pro-
long the interval between childhood and adulthood by preclud-
ing youths from meaningful participation in "adult" activities.
The status of adolescence, popularized in 1905 by G. Stanley
Hall, evolved into a limbo, a precarious marginal position be-
tween childhood and adulthood (Bynum & Thompson, 1989).
The consequences for the informal control of youth crime were
significant.
The system of age stratification which ensued from laws
requiring education and restricting child labor meant that prior,
clearly defined roles in the spheres of work and family were
replaced with more ambiguous roles in the school and peer
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group, leaving youths without a sense of immediate purpose
and direction. Youths became segregated from adult life, and
the school and peer group became their predominant sources
of reference and identity. The capacity of such adult dominated
institutions as the family and work to exert informal social
control over youthful behavior began to diminish, whereas the
socializing force of the peer group increased (Friday & Hage,
1976; Greenberg, 1977). At the same time, the juvenile court
began supplementing the control functions of traditional insti-
tutions and, to the extent that greater reliance was placed on
the state to regulate youthful deviance, the control functions of
those institutions were displaced.
Research (Allan & Steffensmeier, 1989; Duster, 1987) demon-
strating a strong association between crime and both unem-
ployment and underemployment among youths confirms that
the restriction of youths from meaningful labor market partic-
ipation is important for understanding delinquency. When the
bulk of youthful activities shifted to the school and peer group,
youths grew reliant on education and peer interaction for the
esteem, status, and sense of social contribution formerly gained
through work. A youth subculture evolved which placed a pre-
mium on its members having discretionary money (Bute, 1981;
Christie, 1978; Friday & Hage, 1976; Greenberg, 1977; Lowe,
Krahn, & Tanner, 1988; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1978),
but labor market restrictions left youths largely dependent an
their parents for financial support. Paradoxically, the school and
peer group provided youths a certain social autonomy from
the family, but youths were left dependent on their parents for
discretionary funds.
Youths from all class levels are affected by labor market
restrictions but, ultimately, the effects have proven strongest
among youths from the lower classes because of the common
inability of their parents to provide financial support. Remi-
niscent of Merton's (1938) argument, illicit activities such as
theft and drug dealing have come to be perceived as viable
alternatives for attaining material possessions in a society where
status is so often gauged by these possessions. Furthermore,
working class youth are sometimes unable to gain fulfillment
from the school experience, since education is dominated by
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middle class standards and segmented along competitive lines
of talent and ability that parallel those of the modern labor
market (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Schwendinger & Schwendinger,
1978). As Starr (1986, p. 326) indicates, the school represents a
"certifying agency" for the labor market. Youths who are not
well prepared to conform to the demands of the school often
find the experience alienating and degrading. It is therefore
unsurprising that, in the absence of meaningful labor market
participation, like-situated peers and illicit behaviors often as-
sume more relevance than the school for providing status and
esteem (Cohen, 1955).
Market Relations
In the United States, the social position of youth is situated
within the framework of normative principles that regulate pri-
vate market relations. There is a definite tendency for norms
that govern the production and distribution of commodities
in the private marketplace to extend into all spheres of life
(e.g., family and school). To the degree that market relations
permeate society in this fashion, interpersonal cooperation and
collective social welfare can become subordinate considerations
to competition and personal gain. A sense of normative disre-
gard for the well being of others is prompted and, consequently,
informal means of controlling crime lose force (Schwendinger
& Schwendinger, 1985). In addition to reshaping the social po-
sition of young people, the transition to monopoly capitalism
elevated the pervasiveness of private market relations to histor-
ically unrivaled levels, creating what Braverman (1974, p. 271)
terms a "universal market" wherein the totality of the individual
was subsumed by market principles.
Expansions in production that accompanied economic tran-
sition greatly increased the surplus of commodities which, in
turn, created a potential for more liberal patterns of consump-
tion. Moreover, with the emergence of corporate monopolies,
oligopolies, and conglomerates and the decline of small en-
trepreneurs, the primary locus of business competition shifted
from product quality and pricing to marketing and advertising.
Advertising, or what Baran and Sweezy (1966, p. 114) call "the
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sales effort," redefined standards of material possession and
human consumption and, in so doing, played a vital role in
creating new modes of surplus utilization. Consequently, across
social institutions, interpersonal relations grew increasingly ori-
ented to individualistic commodity consumption.
The ascendance of market relations and the altered social
position of youth were mutually reinforcing phenomena. The
greater potential and pressure to consume coinciding with eco-
nomic transformation necessitated greater state regulations to
supplement the responsibility of traditional institutions for en-
suring disciplined consumption patterns among youths. Such
discipline was a prerequisite for a dependable future supply
of labor. Furthermore, the altered social position of youths af-
forded increased leisure (consumption) time by relieving them
of traditional roles and restricting most of their activities to the
school and peer group. With the school and peer group being
arenas ideally suited to promote social comparison and compe-
tition for materialistic status, it is unsurprising that youths have
become a highly profitable advertising market.
Similar to the adolescent status, market relations are ger-
mane to youth crime because, in shaping interaction and so-
cialization in social institutions, these relations detract from the
ability of institutions to maintain informal control. Especially
relevant is the manner in which the wider structure of market re-
lations can affect social interaction in the family and peer group.
When interaction between youths and parents becomes
more oriented toward objectives of self-gain and commodity
consumption than toward intimacy and collective family wel-
fare, the family's ability to exert informal control diminishes.
Yet, the social position of youth provides an incentive for parent-
youth relations to be geared toward commodities. Youths were
excluded from meaningful roles in the labor market during the
same era that the adolescent market became a profitable one for
business to target. As a result, the pressure to consume, which
was being fueled by the peer group, increased, but the power to
do so independently of parental support diminished. As youths
grew more dependent on their parents for economic support,
materialistic considerations began to affect family interaction.
It is not that modern family relations are completely devoid
68 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
of intimacy but, rather, that the intimate relations suited to
enhancing informal control are often contested by the force of
market relations.
Another effect of market relations pertains to parenting prac-
tices and later extends to experiences in school and the peer
group. As Colvin and Pauly (1983) propose, the various work-
place control mechanisms used to compel adults to comply with
the demands of their employment (e.g., threat of dismissal and
layoff, wage levels, technical quotas, advancement opportuni-
ties, and manipulation of status) are reproduced in family life;
the kinds of controls to which adults are exposed as workers
affect the controls they employ as parents (see Kohn, 1969).
Persons such as assembly-line workers who are often subjected
to harsh, coercive, and externally imposed controls at work
(e.g., threat of layoff and piece rates) are likely to practice the
same coercive form of control as parents. By contrast, persons
such as teachers who are subjected to less external coercion and
instead are expected to exercise internal control as workers are
likely to orient their children toward internal, noncoercive self-
control. The greater the coerciveness of family control practices,
the more alienating and negative the parent-child relationship
(Colvin & Pauly, 1983).
The quality of family relationships formed during the early
years of socialization affects school relationships. Children who
develop alienated relations with their parents due to overly
coercive parental control practices are likely to be defined as
requiring coercive control in the school. In Colvin and Pauly's
(1983, p. 537) words, "a child with negative initial bonds is
likely to be placed in a control structure at school that parallels
the coercive family control structure that produced the child's
negative bond." As coercive relations develop between children
and school authorities, children are likely to became alienated
from school, leaving them poorly integrated to the school as
well as the family.
When children approach adolescence, the quality of prior
relationships in the family and school helps guide their choices
for peer group associations. Youths who are poorly integrated to
society's institutions tend to associate with peer groups that dis-
play similarly weak integration (Colvin & Pauly, 1983). Given
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sustained interaction in a group characterized by a deficit of
mainstream norms and definitions, combined with an excess
of delinquent norms and definitions, the likelihood of delin-
quent behavior increases (Matsueda, 1982; Sutherland & Cres-
sey, 1978).
Implicating market relations as a source of delinquent norms
and definitions in peer groups, Schwendinger and Schwen-
dinger (1985) contend that the wider structure of market rela-
tions encroaches on peer groups and erodes the moral,
controlling element of the standards youths adopt in their inter-
personal interactions. Adolescent groups tend to became strati-
fied in relation to one another by identifying and distinguishing
themselves on the basis of material possessions and commodity
consumption. Competition over status is fostered between and
within groups.
Poverty and Inequality
Both the social position of youth and market relations are en-
compassed by the system of class stratification in which groups
are positioned hierarchically in relation to ownership and con-
trol of economic production. Class stratification generates un-
employment and underemployment which, coupled with a lack
of egalitarian tax and welfare measures, are major contributors
to poverty and extreme inequality in the United States (Currie,
1985; Page, 1983).
Historically, any class stratified society that has produced
goods and services far in excess of those required for subsistence
has yielded a surplus of labor. The surplus of labor repre-
sents a resource to be drawn upon during periods of economic
growth and flourishing demands for labor, and by encouraging
competition over jobs, surplus labor helps maintain an upper
cap on wage levels (Greenberg, 1981). With the transition to
monopoly capitalism, however, increasing portions of the sur-
plus labor pool became expendable, ultimately resulting in what
has been described as an underclass of permanently unem-
ployed and underemployed persons (Kramer, 1984; Reiman &
Headlee, 1981; Spitzer, 1975; Wilson, 1987). Disproportionately
young and black, these persons are overrepresented in street
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crime statistics (Allan & Steffensmeier, 1989; Duster, 1987; Hin-
delang, 1978, 1981).
Analyzing the growth of surplus labor in the context of
the shift to monopoly capitalism, Spitzer (1975) observes that, as
industrialization progressed, profit objectives led businesses to
mechanize thus displacing industrial workers with more
efficient forms of technology. Technological displacement maxi-
mized profit by enhancing production quantity and by reducing
the long-term outlays for labor. Mechanization also saturated
markets with surplus products. Due to the need to dispose
of surplus and due to the knowledge and information re-
quirements brought on by technological advances, demands for
industrial labor became outstripped by demands for various
positions in the service sector economy, where higher quality
jobs came to necessitate better educational credentials. Com-
petition for the dwindling number of skilled and semi-skilled
industrial positions increased, while persons with few skills and
less education were left to compete over an inadequate number
of low quality jobs in the industrial and particularly in the
service economies. Though these low quality jobs, sometimes
referred to as secondary labor market positions, usually have
one or two salutary features, seldom are many such features
(e.g., adequate pay and benefits, advancement opportunities,
job security, etc.) combined in a single job (see Edwards, 1979;
Friedman & Friedman, 1986); hence the rise of the contemporary
working poor.
Other factors operated to fuel unemployment and underem-
ployment. As capital accumulated and became concentrated in
fewer hands, the economy grew more monopolized and created
a barrier to entry for entrepreneurs. Given the scale of trans-
action required to successfully compete with big business for
markets under monopoly capitalism, would-be entrepreneurs
became more dependent on large corporations for employment,
thus intensifying competition over higher quality industrial and
service jobs. Later, beginning in the 1960s, the development
of international economic competition resulted in a transfer of
goods-producing jobs overseas and, in so doing, contributed to
the movement of capital away from industry. Such competition
also promoted an overall lowering of domestic industrial wages
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to maintain profit levels. Within industry, masses of capital were
transferred from union to non-union areas of the nation (cf.
Duster, 1987).
The developments just discussed have meant economic
hardship for millions of American youths. Young people are
among the fastest growing poverty groups in the United States,
with one-fifth of the nation's population aged 16-19 and roughly
half of the teenagers in single parent households living at the
poverty level (Gelman, 1990; Sum, Harrington, & Goedicke,
1987). Despite the recent creation of federal employment and
training programs for youths, the gap between youth and adult
unemployment has continued to widen (Lerman, 1986). Indica-
tive of the marginalized status of adolescence, Starr (1986) esti-
mates that teenagers represent approximately one-tenth of the
total United States labor force but approximately a quarter of the
unemployed; and people under age 25 constitute about a quar-
ter of the labor force but about half of the unemployed. Youth-
ful unemployment is concentrated among minority youths and
those from economically disadvantaged families, such that in
the mid 1980s approximately one-third of all teenagers from
poor families were unemployed, and unemployment rates for
black teens continued to range from 40 to 50 percent (Duster,
1987; Gelman, 1990; Sum et al., 1987). New jobs were created
in the 1980s but, as Sum et al. point out, a disproportionately
low number of the jobs were received by youths, and most jobs
obtained by youths during this period were poor quality service
positions (Miller, 1990). All told, the economy has simply failed
to generate enough good jobs to have any noteworthy effect on
poverty and inequality. Redistribution has not been forthcom-
ing, given the reluctance of the state to undertake egalitarian
tax and welfare reform.
'Poverty, Inequality, and Delinquency
Much debate has transpired about the association between
economic disadvantageness and delinquency (e.g., Braithwaite,
1981: Clelland & Carter, 1980; Thornberry & Farnsworth, 1982;
Tittle, Villemez, & Smith, 1978). Recently, some researchers have
advanced the notion that, while poverty and inequality are not
direct causes of youth crime, they interact with other processes
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to affect delinquency indirectly (Blau & Blau, 1982; Currie, 1985;
Larzelere & Patterson, 1990; Michalowski, 1985; Tittle & Meier,
1990), a notion consistent with the view being proposed here.
Poverty and inequality are related to delinquency through the
disintegrative effects they have on social institutions. The harsh
life conditions associated with impoverishment and the ani-
mosities arising from gross inequalities in a wealthy consump-
tive society, where mere wants are prompted than fulfilled,
can upset the web of cooperative social relations that maintain
informal control (Kramer, 1984).
Illustrative of this point is research suggesting that the ef-
fects of poverty and inequality are mediated by parenting prac-
tices. Compared to the parenting practices characteristic of
families at the middle and upper echelons of the class struc-
ture, the practices exercised in disadvantaged families are often
less suited for delinquency prevention. Generally, lower class
parents do not tend to monitor their childrens' activities as
closely, tend to be less consistent in rewarding and punishing
their children, and tend to communicate less effectively with
them (Larzelere & Patterson, 1990).
The reasons for these differences in parenting can be dis-
cerned by examining the interrelated phenomena of family
stress and lack of parenting resources. Lower class parents are
often less able to consistently afford material rewards to in-
duce desired behaviors from their children. Further, as Currie
(1985) remarks, many disadvantaged families are excessively
large relative to their incomes. With the competitive structure of
market relations impinging on family interaction, these families
face internal tensions and conflicts over scarce resources. In
addition, the tremendous stress accompanying financial inse-
curity and hardship can exacerbate conflict to dysfunctional
levels. Such stress frequently creates staunch barriers to ef-
fective communication and conflict resolution. When parents
hold employment, economic pressures often require them to
spend considerable time at work away from their children if
subsistence is to be maintained; this is particularly the case
in the skyrocketing number of single parent homes headed
predominately by women. In the absence of parental monitoring
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and affordable day care resources, a delinquent peer group may
be left to affect socialization (Steinberg, 1986).
The absence of working parents poses special adjustment
problems for adolescents. Parental absence can necessitate that
teens assume adult responsibilities (e.g., caring for younger sib-
lings, doing errands, and even furnishing supplemental income)
in a society where they are not accorded full adult status. The so-
cial position of youth lags behind the earlier pace of adolescent
emancipation in these families, and it is reasonable to expect
that youthful inability or reluctance to fill adult roles will be a
source of family stress and conflict. These factors are antithetical
to the kind of family socialization that prevents delinquency.
Implications
The foregoing theoretical analysis has shown that three in-
terwoven macro forces (i.e., the social position of youth, market
relations, and poverty and inequality) evolved with monopoly
capitalism and contributed to delinquency by jointly under-
mining informal mechanisms of social control. While it is not
the purpose of this paper to present a comprehensive policy
proposal for delinquency reduction, it is appropriate to illus-
trate some of the policy implications of the previous analysis.
No claim is made that these policy considerations are novel
or exhaustive of theoretical implications. Furthermore, the the-
oretical analysis implies that there are historically ingrained
political and economic barriers to resolving the delinquency
problem within the existing structure of monopoly capitalism.
Though discourse is certainly needed about how alternative
political economic structures might help reduce delinquency,
there is also need for discourse about shorter term initiatives
that can be taken within the existing structure (cf. Kramer, 1984;
Michalowski, 1983). The discussion below concentrates on the
latter area.
The theoretical position developed earlier implies that: (a)
delinquency can be substantially reduced by increasing the ca-
pacity of social institutions to maintain informal social control,
and (b) a promising way to strengthen informal controls is to
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target the three macro forces which have historically weakened
them. Without affording youths a social position which enables
them to derive status from full and meaningful participation in
society and without policies to mitigate or cushion the delete-
rious impact of market relations, poverty, and inequality on
social institutions, rates of youth crime are likely to remain
alarmingly high.
Social Position of Youth
Youths would be in a position to participate more fully and
meaningfully in society if they were granted more responsible
and rewarding roles. First, as Bynum and Thompson (1989,
pp. 473-476) point out, youths should be given greater oppor-
tunities for participation in political decision-making processes
that affect them. For example, young people and their par-
ents could routinely be permitted to represent their interests on
school boards and other policy bodies at various levels of gov-
ernment where matters pertaining directly to their welfare are
at issue. Second, restrictive child labor laws should be revised
so youths who choose to hold jobs (rather than or in addition to
attending school) are allowed to perform meaningful work at
competitive wages and benefits. The purpose of laws regulating
youthful labor should be to protect youths from physical danger
and exploitation rather than to curtail adult unemployment and
coerce youths into school attendance. Third, it is questionable
whether compulsory education laws achieve much of value
among teens who have continually found the school experi-
ence alienating and degrading rather than fulfilling. Instead of
mandating that each person attend school until an arbitrary age
is reached, it would seem better to encourage voluntary atten-
dance by trying to ensure that all persons gain status and a sense
of accomplishment from the school experience. For example,
stratified tracking systems could be replaced with curriculum
diversification and enrichment programs tailored to the hetero-
geneity of the population. This would help make the school less
of an agency which replicates the hierarchical and bureaucratic
nature of the labor market. The school should be an arena for
cultivating a wide and variegated range of individual talents,
thereby instilling the desires to learn and contribute to society
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in addition to a well-rounded ability to creatively think about
problems. Finally, juvenile justice practices should be altered.
Serious consideration should be given to eliminating status of-
fense codes because these codes hold youths accountable to a
different standard of behavior than adults and help displace
informal social control. Also, the vast discretion characteristic
of juvenile justice permits inconsistency to flourish and, in the
process, promotes perceptions of injustice and disrespect for the
system among juveniles (Bynum & Thompson, 1989). There is
no defensible reason for denying juveniles any of the legal pro-
tections to which adults are entitled, since doing so reinforces
and legitimates age segregation.
Initiatives like these would help de-marginalize the social
position of youth. The overriding goal is to integrate youths
more fully into society and reduce the extent to which they are
necessarily dependent on the peer group for socialization.
Market Relations
Along with changes in the social position of youth should
come recognition of the pervasive and disintegrative influences
of private market relations on social institutions and concerted
efforts to mitigate those effects. In particular, steps can be taken
to encourage a more cooperative structure of interpersonal re-
lations in the family. For example, serious attention should be
given to the observation that the workplace controls to which
adults are subjected affect how they rear their children; busi-
nesses that rely heavily on external coercion and punitiveness
should institute such measures as worker participation pro-
grams which give workers more control over their labor pro-
cesses thus orienting them toward internal control. Further, in
targeting the youth market, advertisers should become more
sensitive both to the impact of equating status and personal
worth with material possessions and to the negative effects
which the constant pressure to consume can have on family in-
teraction. Government regulations should promote greater
ethics in this domain of advertising. Also, as Currie (1985,
pp. 244-254) suggests, increased government and private sup-
port should be provided for various early intervention pro-
grams aimed at high risk families and youths, including Head
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Start. These interventions should, above all, be geared toward
building interpersonal trust and empathic communication in
the family unit and developing parenting practices grounded
in negotiation, compromise, and conflict resolution skills. The
interventions not only ease the impact of market relations on
families but also cushion the family stress and conflict arising
out of poverty and inequality.
Poverty and Inequality
At the center of initiatives like those under discussion here
must be a firm and long-term commitment from government to
combat poverty and distribute economic resources more evenly
across the population. A federally sponsored full employment
policy, containing provisions for the creation of public jobs
which are tied to the needs of local communities and which
offer sufficient pay and benefits, would assist in expanding the
supply of adequate employment (Currie, 1985; Michalowski,
1983). Efforts to upgrade low quality jabs (i.e., in terms of
pay, benefits, and advancement potential) would complement
a policy of full employment by shrinking the working poor
population. Tax incentive and worker retraining policies meant
to discourage the displacement of workers through technology
and geographical relocation of jobs would also complement full
employment (Michalowski, 1983). Likewise, expansions in job
training programs for youths are required owing to the loss of
manufacturing jobs and, thus, the lessened potential for youths
to gain work experience; the gap between the qualifications
possessed by many youths and the qualifications required to
obtain entry level career positions must be lessened (Duster,
1987; Wilson, 1987). Expanded tax credits for day care and
government subsidies for day care would help insure that more
working parents have access to quality services. Truly egalitar-
ian tax reform and more generous welfare assistance to people
in severe economic need would further alleviate the stress and
conflict faced by many families.
Conclusion
There is no shortage of viable policies that could be adopted
to reduce delinquency. Yet, for approximately the last 15 years,
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the United States has been advancing a "get tough" stance in
an attempt to combat youth crime. This stance has resulted,
for instance, in provisions that make it easier for prosecutors
to transfer juvenile offenders to adult court, sentencing policies
which have escalated rates of juvenile incarceration (especially
for blacks), and the upholding of capital punishment for juve-
niles by the United States Supreme Court. These reactive get
tough measures stand in sharp contrast to what is theoretically
known about the macro sources of the delinquency problem.,
Unless policy becomes proactive and much more closely aligned
with available theoretical knowledge, the United States will
continue to make little if any progress in the area of delin-
quency control.
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